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Abstract:  I  argue against  the orthodox view of the relationship  between
propositional and doxastic justification. The view under criticism is: if p is
propositionally justified for S in virtue of S’s having reason(s) R, and S be-
lieves p on the basis of R, then S’s belief that p is doxastically justified. I
then propose and evaluate alternative accounts of the relationship between
propositional and doxastic justification,  and conclude that we should ex-
plain propositional justification in terms of doxastic justification. If correct,
this proposal would constitute a significant advance in our understanding of
the sources of epistemic justification.
I. The Orthodox View
Imagine two jurors, Miss Knowit and Miss Not, deliberating about the case of Mr. 
Mansour. Both jurors have paid close attention throughout the trial. As a result, both have 
good reason to believe that Mansour is guilty. Each juror goes on to form the belief that 
Mansour is guilty, which he in fact is. Miss Knowit believes he’s guilty because of the evi-
dence presented during the trial. Miss Not believes he’s guilty because he looks suspicious. 
Miss Knowit knows that Mansour is guilty; Miss Not does not. Why the difference? Miss 
Knowit believes he’s guilty on the basis of the good reasons she has, whereas Miss Not, de-
spite having good reasons at her disposal, believes based on mere suspicion.
The basing relation, according to a widespread and influential line of thought, is 
what distinguishes doxastic from propositional justification. (Some put the distinction in 
terms of “justifiable” versus “justified” belief, and we might also put it in terms of “being 
in a position to justifiedly believe” versus “justifiedly believing.”) In virtue of having a 
good reason to believe the defendant guilty, the proposition <Mansour is guilty> is propo-
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sitionally justified for both jurors, and because Miss Knowit’s belief is based on the good 
reasons she has, her belief is doxastically justified or well founded.  Knowledge requires 
doxastic, not merely propositional, justification, which explains why Miss Knowit but not 
Miss Not knows Mansour is guilty. Believing for a good reason is a valuable state, a 
greater achievement than merely having a good reason you fail to properly utilize.
Reflecting on such cases might easily lead you to adopt the following thesis: if p is 
propositionally justified for S in virtue of S’s having reason(s) R, and S believes p on the 
basis of R, then S’s belief that p is doxastically justified. And, indeed, an impressive array 
of epistemologists adopts just this view. For instance, Jonathan Kvanvig remarks,
Doxastic  justification  is  what  you  get  when  you  believe  something  for
which you have propositional justification, and you base your belief on that
which propositionally justifies it.1
According to John Pollock and Joseph Cruz:
To be justified in believing something it is not sufficient merely to have a
good reason for believing it. One could have a good reason at one’s disposal
but never make the connection. [In such a case] what is lacking is that you
do not believe the conclusion on the basis of those reasons.2
Marshall Swain tells us:
It often happens that a person’s belief that h is based upon a set of reasons R
when believing that h on the basis of R is not justified for that person. This
can happen even though the person has other reasons such that if the belief
had been based upon those reasons, then the belief would have been justi-
fied.3
Keith Korcz claims:
1 Kvanvig (2003: section B1). I should note that Kvanvig at times adds that the belief must be 
“properly” based in order to count as doxastically justified. But he never explains what “prop-
erly” amounts to, and often omits it.
2 Pollock and Cruz (1999: 35 – 36). Also see Pollock (1986: 36 – 37).
3 Swain (1979: 25).
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A belief is merely justifiable for a person S when S possesses reasons which
would be sufficient to justify the belief were the belief based on those rea-
sons…. A belief is justified for S when S possesses reasons sufficient to jus-
tify the belief and has made an appropriate connection between her reasons
and her belief. This appropriate connection is the basing relation.4
Richard Feldman says,
S’s belief that p at time t is [doxastically] justified (well-founded) iff (i) be-
lieving p is justified for S at t; (ii) S believes p on the basis of evidence that
supports p.5
William Alston distinguishes between “having adequate grounds” and believing “based on 
an adequate ground,” and claims it is “conceptually true that one is justified in believing 
that p iff one’s belief that p is based on an adequate ground….”6 Having adequate grounds 
and believing on adequate grounds are tantamount to propositional and doxastic justifica-
tion, respectively.
It is instructive to note that epistemologists say similar things about knowledge. For
example, Stewart Cohen, in the course of discussing contextualism and skepticism, consid-
ers the following closure principle: If S knows that p, and S knows that p entails q, then S 
knows that q.7 Cohen then remarks, “Of course, S may not believe q or S may not believe q
on the basis of seeing the entailment, but then S will still be in a position to know q. That 
is, all S has to do to know q is to believe it on the basis of seeing the entailment.”8 Cohen 
apparently endorses the view that to know q you need only believe q on the basis of the 
good reasons you have for q (setting Gettier aside). Our focus is justification, but this 
should remind us that the lessons learned apply to knowledge as well.
4 Korcz (2000: 525 – 526).
5 Feldman (2002: 46). See also Feldman (2004: esp. section 1) and Feldman and Conee (1985: 
section IV).
6 Alston (1985: 190). Alston expresses the same sentiments in his (2005: 90).
7 Cohen (1999: 62).
8 Cohen (1999: 84 n. 14). Emphasis added.
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II. The Orthodox View Refuted
The orthodox view outlined above is wrong. That is, Basis is false.
(Basis) IF (i) p is propositionally justified for S in virtue of
S’s having reason(s) R, and (ii) S believes p on the basis of
R, THEN S’s belief that p is doxastically justified.
Before turning to specific examples, we should ask ourselves whether it is plausible
to think that the way in which a subject makes use of his reasons matters not to whether his 
belief is well founded. Basis makes no mention of the way in which the subject performs in
forming or sustaining a belief. This is not a minor detail. Nor is it something we can set 
aside for present purposes, in the hope that the matter will resolve itself within a more com-
prehensive theory of propositional justification. In evaluating beliefs we are evaluating a 
kind of performance, the performance of a cognitive agent in representing the world as be-
ing a certain way, and when performing with materials (which, in cognitive affairs, will in-
clude reasons or evidence), the success, or lack thereof, of one’s performance will depend 
crucially on the way in which one makes use of those materials. This is true for carpentry 
as well as cognition. Consider a carpenter, equipped with the finest tools and lumber. You 
want a deck built, and he is in a position to build a wonderful one for you. Despite the qual-
ity of his tools and lumber, unless he puts them together in the right way, you are not going 
to be happy with the end result. You want a well built deck, not just one built with tools and
materials fit for making a well built deck. Merely having the right equipment for the job, 
and using it to perform the job, does not guarantee a job well done. As such, I submit that 
we should expect there to be compelling counterexamples to Basis that exploit this glaring 
weakness.
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Ram Neta discusses an example that might at first appear to threaten Basis.9 It in-
volves a subject who bases her belief on conclusive reasons (I use “reasons” where Neta 
uses “evidence”), but does so unreasonably because she ignores relevant counterevidence 
in the process. A proponent of Basis could respond that possessing relevant counterevi-
dence plausibly precludes propositional justification. Another response would be to distin-
guish provisional (prima facie) from all-things-considered (ultima facie) propositional jus-
tification, and clarify that Basis pertains only to the latter, which requires that the subject 
not possess relevant counterevidence. Perhaps neither response will ultimately withstand 
scrutiny, but we can bypass the controversy because examples abound that don’t involve 
subjects ignoring relevant counterevidence.
Let us then turn to the first such example. Consider two of the other jurors, Miss 
Proper and Miss Improper, sitting in judgment of Mr. Mansour. Each paid close attention 
throughout the trial. As a result, each knows the following things:
(P1) Mansour had a motive to kill the victim.
(P2) Mansour had previously threatened to kill the victim.
(P3) Multiple eyewitnesses place Mansour at the crime scene.
(P4) Mansour’s fingerprints were all over the murder weapon.
<Mansour is guilty> is propositionally justified for both jurors because each knows (P1 – 
P4).10 As it happens, each comes to believe <Mansour is guilty> as the result of an episode 
9 Neta (2002: 671). Pryor (2004: 365) considers a similar example and draws a similar lesson.
10 Must the jurors also believe that (P1 – P4) constitute good evidence to conclude that Mansour is
guilty in order for their knowledge of (P1 – P4) to propositionally justify that conclusion for 
them? No, because that would impose an unacceptably stringent condition on propositional justi-
fication. Human children, who may not even possess the concept of evidence, are propositionally 
justified in believing many things. Lacking the concept of evidence, they cannot so much as en-
tertain the thought that X is evidence for Y, much less believe such a thing. See also Conee and 
Feldman (2001: 75 – 76).
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of explicit, conscious reasoning that features (P1 – P4) essentially. Miss Proper reasons like
so:
(Proper  Reasoning)   (P1  –  P4)  make  it  overwhelmingly
likely that Mansour is guilty. (P1 – P4) are true. Therefore,
Mansour is guilty.
Miss Improper, by contrast, reasons like this:
(Improper Reasoning)   The tea leaves  say that  (P1 – P4)
make it overwhelmingly likely that Mansour is guilty. (P1 –
P4) are true. Therefore, Mansour is guilty.
Each juror satisfies conditions (i) and (ii), yet only Miss Proper’s belief that Man-
sour is guilty is doxastically justified. Only Miss Proper is justified in believing as she does
that he is guilty. Miss Improper’s belief that Mansour is guilty is based on the reasons that 
propositionally justify <Mansour is guilty> for her, but only in light of the tea-leaf reading, 
which spoils things. Her belief is improperly based on (P1 – P4), whereas Miss Proper’s is 
properly based.
The same example shows that Basis+ fails.11
(Basis+) IF (i) p is propositionally justified for S in virtue of
S’s having reason(s) R, and (ii) S believes p on the basis of
R as evidence for p,  THEN S’s belief that  p is doxastically
justified.
11 Fairweather (2001: 74 – 75) suggests something like this view.
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Miss Improper does base her belief on (P1 – P4) as evidence for <Mansour is guilty>. It is 
part of the content of her reasoning that (P1 – P4) make <Mansour is guilty> overwhelm-
ingly probable.12
Some might object that my example depends on adding to the basis of Miss Im-
proper’s belief.13 This observation might then naturally lead to a revised principle:
(Austere Basis)  IF (i) p is propositionally justified for S in
virtue of S’s having reason(s) R, and (ii) S believes p on the
basis of R and only R, THEN S’s belief that p is doxastically
justified.
Austere Basis has extremely limited application. How often do we believe something for 
only those reasons that propositionally justify it for us? It’s trifling even if true. It also gives
the wrong verdict in the following case.
Mr. Ponens and Mr. F.A. Lacy each knows the following things:
(P5) The Spurs will win if they play the Pistons.
(P6) The Spurs will play the Pistons.
This is a paradigm case of propositional justification. <The Spurs will win> is proposition-
ally justified for each man because he knows (P5) and (P6). This satisfies clause (i). From 
these two premises, and only these premises, each man draws the conclusion:
(P7) Therefore, the Spurs will win.
This satisfies clause (ii). But the devil is in the details. Ponens applies modus ponens to 
reach the conclusion. Lacy, however, applies a different inference rule, which we may call 
12 If it’s not obvious that the content of her reasoning as described fits the bill, we can modify the 
case accordingly.
13 Thanks to Juan Comesaña for conversation on this point.
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modus profusus: for any p, q, and r: (p  q)  r. Lacy’s belief that the Spurs will win is 
definitely not doxastically justified; following that rule could never lead to a justified be-
lief. This is a counterexample to Austere Basis. It also works against Basis.
So there are powerful counterexamples to Basis and company. But the problem 
goes deeper than mere counterexamples. As noted earlier, Basis misses something deep 
and important about the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification. The 
way in which the subject performs, the manner in which she makes use of her reasons fun-
damentally determines whether her belief is doxastically justified. Poor utilization of even 
the best reasons for believing p will prevent you from justifiedly believing or knowing that 
p.
I want to emphasize two further points about the discussion of Basis and its ilk. 
First, the intuitions about the counterexamples do not rely on any particular theory of the 
epistemic basing relation. It matters not to the examples whether the belief is based on the 
reasons in virtue of the reasons causing the belief, or whether the belief is based on the rea-
sons in virtue of the subject having an evidential belief to the effect that the reasons in 
question are indeed good reasons to accept the conclusion, or whether the basing relation 
obtains in virtue of both the reason causing the belief and the subject having the evidential 
belief. To demonstrate this, notice that in the case of Ponens and Lacy, we can add these 
details arbitrarily and it does not affect the intuition that Ponens’ belief in the conclusion is 
doxastically justified whereas Lacy’s belief is not. I stipulate that Ponens’ belief in (P7) is 
(non-deviantly) caused by his belief in (P5) and (P6), and the same is true of Lacy; I also 
stipulate that Ponens believes that the conjunction of (P5) and (P6) constitutes an impecca-
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bly good reason to believe (P7), and the same is true of Lacy. None of this affects the intu-
ition that Ponens’ belief is doxastically justified, whereas Lacy’s belief definitely is not.
Second, and closely related to the first point, neither the thesis being argued for 
here, nor the examples offered in support of it, have anything to do with the “Gypsy-
lawyer” cases that often feature prominently in discussions involving the epistemic basing 
relation. Gypsy-lawyer cases—so called because the original case in this genre, due to 
Keith Lehrer, featured a “Gypsy lawyer”14—are put forward as purported counterexamples 
to causal theories of the epistemic basing relation, the upshot supposedly being that a belief
need not be caused by a reason in order to be based on that reason. Even if this were 
granted, it would not, of course, impugn the view that certain kinds of causation are suffi-
cient to establish a basing relation, a point Lehrer himself recognizes.15 Nothing in the ex-
amples offered here requires us to take a stand on the merit of Gypsy-lawyer cases or the 
view that causation is necessary for basing. And the claim that Basis and its ilk are false 
quite obviously bears no relation to whether causation is necessary for basing.
That should suffice to quell suspicions that my discussion somehow smuggles in 
controversial assumptions regarding the basing relation. However, out of an abundance of
caution, I will briefly explain the anatomy of Gypsy-lawyer cases, so that even those 
readers inordinately concerned with such cases may satisfy themselves that the present 
discussion is orthogonal to the issues at stake in Gypsy-lawyer cases. (Those who harbor 
no such suspicions may simply skip the rest of this paragraph.) Gypsy-lawyer cases all 
share the same basic structure.16 At time t, S has a true belief that p, completely causally 
14 Lehrer (1971).
15 Lehrer (1990: 169).
16 See, e.g., Korcz (2000: 528 – 532), Lehrer (1971; 1990: 169), Pappas (1979: 57 – 58), and Har-
man (1973: 31 – 32), all of whom offer their own variants.  Sometimes the case is pitched in 
terms of knowledge, other times in terms of doxastic justification.
Propositional and Doxastic Justification                                                                              10  
sustained by inadequate reason R. S believes p as strongly as he possible can. S obviously
does not know p. At some subsequent time t', S acquires reason R*, which is an adequate 
reason to believe p. S explicitly recognizes that R* is an adequate reason to believe p. 
Nevertheless, R continues to fully causally sustain S’s belief, and R* in no way contrib-
utes. Yet it is (supposedly) intuitively obvious that S comes to know p at t'. S could know
p only if his belief was based on adequate reasons, and ex hypothesi R* is the only ade-
quate reason S has, thus it follows that his belief comes to be based on R*. But S’s belief 
is causally independent of R*, so a belief need not be caused by a reason in order to be 
based on that reason. As should be plain, the issues raised by this sort of case bear no re-
lation to the main points I am concerned to make in this paper.
III.Alternative Proposals
It is standardly assumed that there is some deep and important relationship between 
propositional and doxastic justification. One might disagree, taking the position that they 
are only tenuously related, or even totally independent of one another. Nevertheless, I find 
the standard assumption plausible, and will adopt it as my own.
Doxastic justification cannot be understood simply as propositional justification 
plus basing. What, then, is the relationship between propositional and doxastic justifica-
tion? Rather than try to understand doxastic justification in terms of propositional justifica-
tion, perhaps a different approach is in order. In proceeding, we must keep in mind that any
account of the relationship will be sorely lacking if it neglects the crucial role of the proper,
competent use of reasons. It would be completely unsurprising if we were unable to state 
individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for propositional justification. Nev-
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ertheless, I propose that we can make progress in understanding that concept along the fol-
lowing lines.
(PJ) Necessarily, for all S,  p, and  t,  if p is propositionally
justified for S at t, then p is propositionally justified for S at
t BECAUSE S currently possesses at least one means of coming
to believe  p such that, were S to believe  p in one of those
ways, S’s belief would thereby be doxastically justified.17, 18
In a word, the subject’s intellectual abilities explain why she is in a position to justifiedly 
believe or know p.19
PJ should command our attention for several reasons. First, because it provides an 
illuminating explanation of what goes on in paradigm cases of propositional justification. 
Recall the case of Messrs Ponens and Lacy. Each of them knows things that would lead 
any normal human adult competently to arrive, by a straightforward application of modus 
ponens, at the conclusion that the Spurs will win. Miss Proper and Miss Improper are as ca-
pable as any other normal human adult of competent explanatory reasoning, and each 
17 Strictly speaking, it should read ‘believing p’ rather than ‘coming to believe p’. If your belief 
that p is doxastically justified, then p is propositionally justified for you, even if you don’t 
presently have a means of coming to believe p, as would perhaps be the case if you already be-
lieved it. This minor point doesn’t alter the basic proposal, so to simplify the discussion I shall 
stick with the formulation in the text.
18 Compare Goldman’s (1979: 351 – 352) definition of ex ante justification in terms of ex post 
justification: “Person S is ex ante justified in believing p at t if and only if there is a reliable be-
lief-forming operation available to S which is such that if S applied that operation to this total 
cognitive state at t, S would believe p at t-plus-delta (for a suitably small delta) and that belief 
would be ex post justified.” As Goldman (1979: 353 n. 17) himself notes, the ex ante/ex post dis-
tinction is closely related to the propositional/doxastic distinction we’ve been discussing. I do not,
whereas Goldman does, attempt to state necessary and sufficient conditions.
19 Compare Sosa’s (2003: ch. 7, esp. pp. 127 – 8, 134, and 138) discussion of the speckled hen 
and related issues, as well as his (2004: 287 – 290) response to Richard Feldman. Also relevant 
here are Greco (1999) and (forthcoming).
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knows things, regarding which by far the most plausible explanation is the guilt of Man-
sour.
Second, because PJ provides a model for understanding how non-reason-based 
doxastically-justified belief and knowledge is possible. It would provide for non-reason-
based doxastically-justified belief if one could competently acquire or sustain belief in 
some proposition without doing so on the basis of a reason. I submit that the belief in one’s 
own existence is like this.20 Descartes notwithstanding, it is highly implausible that I need a
reason to justifiedly believe, or know, for that matter, that I exist. Of course, the fact that I 
have abundant reasons to believe that I exist is irrelevant to whether I need such reasons for
my belief in my own existence to rise to the level of doxastic justification or knowledge. 
Let me be clear: I am not suggesting that the epistemic status of these cogito beliefs is 
somehow in question. They obviously possess epistemic status par excellence—that is an 
unquestionable datum, to which theory is answerable. My point is that PJ helps us better 
understand an important dimension of their epistemic status, and this is a virtue of the the-
ory.
Third, because PJ withstands a spate of initially compelling objections. One ini-
tially compelling objection to PJ stems from the thought that certain propositions can be 
propositionally justified for you, but coming to believe them would destroy the evidence 
you had for them, guaranteeing a doxastically unjustified belief.21 Suppose Sanders is 
learning about physics. He is reflective enough to know that he has considered only the 
Newtonian concept of force, defined as mass times acceleration. Intuitively, <I have never 
considered the proposition that force equals mass divided by acceleration> is proposition-
20 Some memory beliefs (beliefs “based on memory”) may also be like this.
21 What follows is a modified version of one of Kvanvig’s (2003: section B1) cases.
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ally justified for Sanders; after all, he knows something that straightforwardly entails it. 
Nevertheless, coming to believe it would provide him with conclusive reason to disbelieve 
it, in which case he could not justifiedly believe it. Thus, says the opponent, PJ cannot do 
justice to our intuitions in this kind of case.
I am unpersuaded by such examples. The obvious response is that the case is 
slightly but importantly misdescribed. The proposition that is propositionally justified for 
Sanders is <I have never before considered the proposition that force equals mass divided 
by acceleration>, and obviously Sanders can justifiedly believe that. It is perfectly natural 
to leave the ‘before’ implicit in ordinary conversation, and the Sanders example trades on 
this in order to give the appearance of posing a problem for PJ. Consider: the therapist 
asks, “Have you ever considered divorcing your husband?” and the woman responds, “I’ve 
never so much as entertained the thought.” The woman needn’t retract her statement were 
the therapist to continue, “Never, you say? What about just now when I asked? You had to 
entertain it to understand my question.” At most, the woman would clarify, “I of course 
meant that I had never entertained the thought before you asked about it”—though an icy 
stare seems a more likely response.
Having dealt with potential counterexamples wherein deliberation destroys evi-
dence, the flip side of that worry may command our attention, to wit, deliberation some-
times creates evidence.22 This exploits the vagueness in what it is to “currently possess a 
means.” Suppose a first-year logic student knows the introduction and elimination rules for 
conjunction and disjunction in a natural deduction system, but he hasn’t yet proven either 
of DeMorgan’s Laws. Consider the Law that a negation of a conjunction is equivalent to a 
disjunction of the negations of the conjuncts: (p  q)  (p  q). He currently pos-
22 Thanks to Ernie Sosa for conversation on this point.
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sesses a means such that, were he to employ it, he would come to justifiedly believe that 
Law. That much seems right. Notice, however, that this implies that, even before he goes 
through the proof, he possesses a means such that, were he to employ it, he would justi-
fiedly believe <I have proven one of DeMorgan’s Laws>: he just needs to go through the 
proof, reflect on what he just accomplished, and then form the relevant belief in light of 
that. However, no such thing is propositionally justified for him beforehand.
This would be a problem for the present proposal only if PJ claimed:
IF S currently possesses at least one means of coming to be-
lieve p such that were S to believe p in one of those ways,
S’s belief would thereby be doxastically justified, THEN p is
propositionally justified for S,
which it does not. 
Thus, PJ has much to recommend it. But we would be remiss if we failed to note 
that the following sort of case presents a noteworthy challenge to PJ. Suppose that Ron 
knows that invading Iran would be catastrophically stupid, and that if invading Iran would 
be catastrophically stupid, then the U.S. ought not to invade Iran. Intuitively, the proposi-
tion <the U.S. ought not to invade Iran> is propositionally justified for Ron. Now we add 
that Ron is presently incapable of coming to believe that the U.S. ought not to invade Iran. 
Having listened to right-wing talk radio and watched Fox News for far too long, Ron is 
simply psychologically incapable of believing that the U.S. ought not to invade any coun-
try, much less Iran. Thus, he does not presently have a means of coming to justifiedly be-
lieve that the U.S. ought not to invade Iran, because he doesn’t have any means of coming 
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to believe it. Nevertheless, the intuition persists that <the U.S. ought not to invade Iran> is 
propositionally justified for him, which now cannot be because of any ability Ron has to 
competently arrive at that conclusion.
  Apparently we are inclined to abstract away from Ron’s odd disability regarding 
the proposition <the U.S. ought not to invade Iran>. Surely Ron is not like this with respect
to most propositions, and most of the time he is not even like this with respect to this spe-
cific proposition: normally, if he knows that p, and knows that q if p, then he has the 
wherewithal to competently reason his way, via an application of modus ponens, to a belief
in q. And this more general ability, it might plausibly be argued, grounds the intuition that 
the ‘q’ in this case is propositionally justified for Ron, despite his strange circumstances.
It might be replied that I have made things too easy on myself. Let’s stipulate that 
Ron suffers from a general disability to reason from knowledge of a conditional and its an-
tecedent, to a belief in its consequent. Don’t we still have the intuition that <the U.S. ought 
not to invade Iran> is propositionally justified for Ron, given what else he knows? My intu-
ition about this version of the case is noticeably less clear than about the previous one. 
Moreover, I doubt whether we should trust very strongly our intuitions about such a strange
case. Conditional reasoning is so fundamental to our intellectual lives that I am hard 
pressed to make sense of Ron. It would not be unreasonable to respond by granting that 
knowledge of p and q if p would be a good reason for us to believe q, yet deny that it is a 
good reason for Ron in this case, due to his strange disability. This, I think, is enough to ac-
count for any positive intuition we have about Ron’s epistemic position vis-à-vis q.
But there is a more direct response available. Even lacking facility with conditional 
reasoning, Ron can easily still competently reason his way to the conclusion via disjunctive
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syllogism. q if p is logically equivalent to either not-p or q; given knowledge of p, then, it 
follows straightforwardly by elementary inference that q. Thus, even in the more extrava-
gant version of the case, Ron does have a means of justifiedly coming to believe q after 
all.23
Despite success in staving off this challenge to PJ, we still might learn an important
lesson from cases like Ron’s. Hints may also be gleaned from something I said in support 
of PJ earlier:
PJ should command our attention ... because it provides an illuminating ex-
planation of what goes on in paradigm cases of propositional justification.
Recall the case of Messrs Ponens and Lacy. Each of them knows things
that  would  lead  any  normal  human  adult competently  to  arrive,  by  a
straightforward application of  modus ponens,  at  the conclusion that  the
Spurs will  win. Miss Proper and Miss Improper are  as capable as any
other normal human adult of competent explanatory reasoning, and each
knows things, regarding which by far the most plausible explanation is the
guilt of Mansour.
Perhaps the intuitive plausibility of PJ derives from the extent to which it overlaps with a 
deeper principle governing propositional justification. If so, then PJ will have served its 
purpose in guiding us toward an important insight into the nature of justification.
Here is one suggestion as to what that deeper principle might be.24 Judgments about
propositional and doxastic justification are moderately idealized, in that they abstract away,
to a greater or lesser degree, from the abilities and powers of the specific agent in question, 
to the abilities and powers manifested in a typical performance by a competent member of 
the agent’s kind. In Ron’s case, for example, we have in mind a competent intellectual per-
formance by a normal human adult, who doubtless would be able to competently and ef-
23 Should the proponent of the extravagant case complain that it would be unusual for someone to 
reason in this way, I would beg him only to consider how unusual he made poor Ron to begin 
with.
24 For a related discussion of “being in a position to know,” see Sosa (1991: 27 – 29, 49).
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fortlessly reason his way to the relevant conclusion. This idealized competent performance 
would then explain why the conclusion is propositionally justified for Ron. The same is 
true in the cases of Messrs Ponens and Lacy, and Misses Proper and Improper, although we
missed the deeper explanation in the latter cases because the subjects in question were ca-
pable of competent performances typical of a normal adult human. It is only in Ron’s case, 
where the subject’s capabilities diverge significantly from the capabilities of a normal adult
human, that the deeper principle suggests itself.
Yet if we idealize to the agent’s kind, rather than idealizing to a typical perfor-
mance of the specific agent in question, it becomes difficult to explain the propositional 
justification enjoyed by extraordinary humans whose intellectual powers far outstrip the 
typical human’s. Imagine, for instance, that Cedric is the most brilliant logician in the 
world. Suppose that Cedric is considering whether some proposition, T, is a theorem of 
some set of axioms, A. T is in fact a theorem of A, and Cedric would normally be able to 
discover this with ease and in short order, via some clever algorithm he devised. Intuitively,
the proposition <T is a theorem of A> is propositionally justified for Cedric. However, this 
cannot be because a typical human adult would be led to that conclusion through compe-
tent reasoning, because by hypothesis the logical acumen required to reach that conclusion 
far exceeds the typical human adult’s abilities and powers.
It is possible, then, that the sources of propositional justification are multiple, but in 
a way that reveals a deeper unity. In cases such as Ron’s, where the subject is in some way 
defective (with respect to the topic at hand, at least), we abstract away from his abilities to 
those a typical member of his kind. In cases such as Cedric’s, where the subject is in some 
way intellectually extraordinary (again, at least with respect to the topic at hand), our judg-
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ment is guided by the abilities and powers manifested in a typical performance of the sub-
ject’s own. In either case, though, an idealized competent performance of some agent, 
closely related to the subject in question, will explain why the subject is propositionally 
justified.
IV. Conclusion
In summary, I conclude that the orthodox view of the relationship between proposi-
tional and doxastic justification is false. Its failure is instructive, however, pointing the way 
toward a better understanding of the relationship between those two kinds of justification. 
The present proposal, which explains propositional justification in terms of doxastic justifi-
cation, builds on insights gained through a close examination of the orthodox view. If suc-
cessful, it marks a significant advance in our understanding of the sources of epistemic jus-
tification.25
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